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Preflace.
In writing this thesis it is not the intention of'
the writer to state arty new theories with regard to the
law of Real Property nor has an attempt been made to lay
down any new propositions of law. On the contrary an en-
deavor has been made to give but a brief outline of smme
of the prominent changes in thelaw of Real Property.
As a general rule, most of the text books upon the
law of Real Property give the bewildered student but a
faint idea of the law as it exists to-day. He is re-0
quired to plunge blindly into the labyrinth ol' absurd
fictions, exploded theories and blind superstitions which
form the basis of so imuch of cur law of Real Property.
He is expected to examine these carefully and to evolve
therefrom a system of law which he may reconcile with
the almost countless conflicting decisions of the courts

3of numer6us jurisdictions; and finally, when he has sat-
isfied himself that he has acquired a conception of what
the law 1n general principles really ought to be, he is
told by the legislature that his labor has availed him
nught - the law has been changed. In the following pag-
es no attempt has been Made to state all the charges in
the law of Real Property in Pennsylvania. To do this
would require a volume of no small proportions. That
part of the law of Real Property of the state which treats
of titles and conveyancing has heen entirely omitted,
with the single exception of a brief reference to the Re-
cording Acts. While both of these s~ibjects form an im-
portant branch of the law of Real Property, the writer
has deemed it wise to limit his research to the law of
estates, leaving the subject of "titles" to be investi-
gated at some future day.
That part of the law of Pennsylvania which is simi-
lar to the old common law of England can find no place in
this thesis - it is not within the scope intended.
In several instarnces the similarity of the law of
the State to the commn'on law has been briefly commented
upon, but in most cases it has not been mentioned. Penn-
4sylvania being one of the firmest adherents to conmmon law
principles has adopted as her own the great body of the
coimron law of' England subject only to such chares as her
institutions may demand. In addition to these chw.ges
the legislature has seen fit, from time to time to intro-
di,.ce additional changes eiMer on account of public policy
or for the purpose o!' effecting Justice. Some of the
more prominernt of these changes I have endeavored to enum-
erate and comment upon in connection with some of the
changes which have been effected by various adjudications
of t-e courts of the state. While the changes entumer-
ated here do not comprise the whole number, still it is
hoped that such as have been mentioned may lead some
other student of Pennsylvania Law to discover additional
changes and study the law of Real Property of his state
with greater facility and satisfaction.
Previous to the reign of Charles II, England had
been a slave to the feudal system. Long suffering and
oppression had accustomed the sturdy, liberty-loving
Anglo-Saxon to the tyranny of his lord. Though the feu-
dal system had long previously outgrown its age of use-
fulness it was not until the statute 12 Car. II was pass-
ed that any substantial relief was obtained and the an-
tiquated and complex system of land tenures which had so
long prevailed reduced to any degree of simplicity. By
the statute above referred to host of the feudal burdens
were cast off and all tenures in general, except ±rankal-
moign, grand sergeantry and copyhold, were reduced to one
general species of tenure called "free and common soc-
age." But the leading characteristics of the feudal ten-
ures still remained and hampered to a greater or less ex-
6tent the free alienation of landed property.
Such, in brief, was the situation in England, in
1681 when Charles II granted, by letters patent, the pro-
vince, of Pennsyluania to William Penn. In the previous
charters it had been stipulated "that the grantees and
their descendants should be considered as subjects born
within the realm." There was no provision of' this na-
ture in the charter to Penn which provided however "that
acts of Parliament concerning trade, navigation, and the
customs, should be duly observed." And further, "that
no custom or other contribution should be laid on the in-
habitants, or their estates, unless by the consent of the
proprietary, or governor and assemblynr by act ci Parlia-
ment in England." The' sovereignty of the coumtry was
reserved to the king and his successors, but "the lands,
isles, inlets, etc. were to be holdei to the said William
Penn, his heirs and assigns, and in free and coimnon soc-
age, by fealty only, for a-1 services, and not in capite
or by knight-service." Soon afterwards a settlement was
cormmenced, and & form of governmlent prepared by Penln.
One of the first tasks undertaken by Penn u~pon his arr iv-
al in the province in 1681 was to treat with the Indians,
7for the extinguishment of their claims to the possession
of the territory. it was agreed that no lands should
besold to any person but Penn or his agents and that the
latter should not occupy, nor grant an:y lands, but such
as should be fairly purchased of' the Indians. Penn faith-
fully observed this engagerment, and the Indian claim to
all lands within the present limits of the state, has
been extinguished by operation of successive purchases.
Various prohibitory laws with severe penalties annexed
for the violation thereof were passedIto prevent any in-
trusion or settlement of the unpurchased lands of' the
Indians. So sacred was this principle esteemed, that it
was held to be a rule of property, that a grant of lands
before such title had been extinguished, was void.
(Thompson V. Johnson, 6 Binn. 68(1815). Thus, title to
all the lands in Pennsylvania, is derived from the Indi-
ans,not by acquisition and conquest, the result of a cru-
el and relentles war of extermination and disposition,
but by a fair, equitable and just treaty of purchase en-
tered into by the Indians voluntarily, without any coer-
cion, duress or com pulsion of an~y sort, and every sale
was to be upon a valuable consideration.
8What a vast eof.trast between the policy instituted
and carried out by Penn and which was adriered to so scrup-,,
ulously by his successors and subsequently by the state,
and that pursued by the Governors of' the other col.onies
whose admirAstrations are stained and marred by deeds of
dishonor, broken pledges and injustice to the Indians.
The title to the soil being thus vested in the pro-
prietary, he had the undisputed right to dispose of it
in whatever manner he thought proper. Availing himself
of this right Penn established a land department, the
officers and coimmissioners of' which were his agents. NO
regular system was adhered to in making and confirming
grants to individuals. The leadinrg object being to sur-
vey off each particular grant, and have the survey re-
turned into the land office, and thereupon to grant a
patent. But as may be supposed, great irregularities
were introduced and as a result, titles to lands became
complicated and for a long time insecure. But the leg-
islature, aided by the adjudications of the cnurts, at
length perfected a systerm which has almost quieted con-
troversies arising out 'of' original titles. Penn's char-
ter provided "that the laws for regulating afld governing
9property, within the said province, as well for the des-
cent and enjoyment of lands, as likewise for the enjoy-
ment and succession of' goods and chattelsv etc., should
be azd continue the same, as they shall be for the time
being, by the general courts of the laws of England, un-
til the said laws shall be altered by the said William
Penn, his heirs or assigns, aAd by the freemen of' the-
said province, t eir delegates or deputies, or the greater
part of them." (Penn's charter sec. VI, Colonial Records
vol. I, p. 17. ). By the 17th section he had the right
"to parcel out the lands among purchasers, tobeholdenof
himself and his heirs, by such services, customs and rents,
as to him or them should seem fit, and not immediately
of the crown."
The revolution having dissolved all political con-
nection wiff.: the crown of Great Britian, soon atter its
close, viz in 1779, by an act of' the legislature (lS.
Laws, 479) the estates of' the late proprietaries, were
Vested absolutely in the commoiwealth. Thus by a sin-
gle strike the sovereign will of' the people of' the n~ewly
erected state made the soil and lands within its juris-
diction (with certain exceptions) "sub,]ect to such dis-
10
posal, alienation, conveyance, division and appropriation
as to this or any future legislature of this commonwealth
shall from time to time setm meet and expedient in pur-
suance of such law or laws as shall for that purpose here
after be madeaad provided." The act also confirmed all
previous titles of whatever kind from the proprietaries
etc., while the arrears of purchase money for lands, (ex-
cept the proprietary tenths) were made payable to the corn.
monwealth; all proprietary quit rents were extinguished,
and the tenure from free-socage became a.llodial, the gran-
tees being vested in their own right with the absolute
title, mconrnected with any superior, and not subject to
any service. Various statutes were subsequently passed
for the purpose of regulating the granting of letters
patent to warranties by the state. The result of these
changes is well and clearly stated by Judge Reed in com-
menting upon Blackstone's Commentaries He says, "In
reviewing the preceding chapters in the Commentaries, on
the subject of titles and tenures, and contrasting them
with our free, unencumbered, and absolute estates, one
cannot suppress his astonishment, at the immeasurable dif-
ference between them. Every species of oppressive bur-
11
den, that an unlimited prerogative, and insatiable cupid-
ity could suggest, and but illy concealed by a long train
of absurd fictions, is attached to the one, while the
other is absolutely free from all restrictions and Incum-
brances, iand the holder is contemaplated as the lord par-
amount of his own estate." (Pennsylvania Blackstone, Vol.
I, p.359 ).
It has bee miaintained by some high authorities that
tenures do not now exist in Pennsylvania. The leading
champion of this view was Judge Woodward, who expressly
decided in Wallace V. Harmstad, 8 Wr. 499, that since the
revolution, Pennsylvania titles are allodial, hot feudal.
But the weight of authority seems to be the other way.
Professor Mitchell of the University of Pennsylvania in
referring to this question, says, - "it is a question on
which high authorities are ranged on either side, whether
tenures now exist in Pe:nrsylvania. Tenures certainly
did exist here prior to the revolution, anid, it is believed
12
no lawyer ever questioned it, and the better opinion is
that they still exist." This view is also supported by
Chief Justice Sharswood, in a note to his edition of
Blackstone, Bk. II ch. VI at p. 77. He says: "In Penn-
sylvaria, it lhas been decided that the statute Quia Emp-
tores was never in force, and subin-feudation always law-
ful; and though there are some opinions that tenures fell
with the revolution, yet allagree that they existed be-
fore, and the better opinion appears to be that they still
exist. The principles of' the feudal system, in truth
underlie all the doctrines of' the common law in regard to
real estate, and wherever that law is recognized recourse
must be had to feudal principles to understand and carry
out the common law."
"The principles of" the feudal system," said chief-
justice Tilglman, "are so interwoven with our jurispru-
dence that there is no removing them without destroying
the whole texture." Lyle V. Richards, 9 S and R., 333.
"Though our property is allodial," said chiefl-Jus-
ice Gibson, "yet f'eudal tenures may be said to exist a-
mong us in their consequences and the qualities which
13
they OrIginally imparted to estates; as for jiistance, in
precluding every limitation founded on an abeyance of' tlo-
fee." (ic.Call v. Nuly, 3 Watts, 71.) In support of the
view taken by these authorities is the fact that the 1Divestm
ing Act of 27 February, 1779, jras simply a transfer of
the propriotariese rights to the commonwealth. There
is not a single section in this act abolishing any lord-
ship, etc, - they were transferred only. And though the
commonwealth, is not regarded, in tile feudal light, su-
perior lord of the snil, and though the lands of intivid-e
uals are not held mediately of' the state, upon fealty or
any other service, yet, the government of' the state, be-
ing one founded by universal consent, is unlimited in its
powers and authority, except so far, as exceptions are
enumerated in the constitution; with this limitation, the
legislative power embraces all cases affecting the pub-
lic good, both as it regards the co mnity as a whole,
and the individual members compfosing it. It was one of
the fmdamental principles of property that where no one
individual has an exclusive right to any specific piece
of property it belongs to the comunity. Agreeably to
this principle tbelegislatuire of' Pe:nsylvania has enacted
14
from time to time various acts the first of which was
passed in 1787, the rreamble of which declared it to be
an act "to declare and regulate escheats."
One species only was provided for. That is, where
any person at the time of his or her death, "is seized or
possessced of' any real or personal estate, within this com-
monwealth, and dies intestate, without heirs, or any known
kindred, such estates shall escheat to the commonwealth."
2 S Laws, 425. Escheats "propter delictum tenentis",
are entirely abolished by the constitution of the United
States, (Art I. Sec. IV. Subs. 3; sec. X, sub. 1; Art.III
sec. III sub. 2) and of the commomwealth (Art. I, sec.18-
19) . It is evident therefore, that in Pennsylvania
"the owner of land still stands in a relation to the state
which corresponds, in some degree, to feudal tenure; for
whenever the title to land fails, through defect of heirs
the land reverts by escheat to the State, which therefore
occupies, so far as the doctrine of reverter is corfcerned
the position of' paramount lord.
15
For the purpose of convenience I shall follow to a
great extent the arrangement of' Blackstone in the Second
Book of the Commentaries. It is easier and more natural
to follow the wellbeaten path. And in accordance with
this arrangement I propose to consider briefly, first,
Free hold Estates of Inheritance.
Blackstone has defined an estate of' freehold to be
"such an-estate in lands as is conveyed by livery of seiz-
in, or in tenemeiats of any incorporeal nature, by what is
equivalent thereto." This definition may be accepted
as fa correct statement of the common law meaning of the
t-errml.
While this definition may proye very satisfactory to
the Pennsylvania lawyer as to the origin &f this estates,
it gives but an imperfect idea of the subject as under-
stood in that state, where the right of property always
draws after it the right of' possession. And when by con-
sent the one id transferred, the law furnishes the 9eans
I
of obtaining the other. In Pennsylvania lIvery of seisin
16
is unknown, and the term "possession of" the soil by a
freeian" has little if any place in the jurisprudence of
the state except as a relic of antiquity.
Any estate in lands or tenements, however created,
whether of inheritance or for life, is considered a free-
hold, the ownership and not the possession giving charac-
ter to the estate.
As we have already observed, the feudal doctrine with
rega d to land tenures in Pennsylvania is entirely explod-
ed, and every owner of land holds it in his own right,
without owing any rent or service to any superior. He
holds not in his demesne as of' fee, but absolutely in
dominico suo. RespeCt for precedent and ancient forms,
alone has continued the expression as of' fee'though the
reasons for its former use have no relation to the present
condition of Pennsylvania titles. But the general char-
acteristics or this estate are very similar to the estate
of fee Bimple at common law. It is only necessary, there-
fore to poilnt out a few of the distinguishing character-
17
istics in order to give an, idea of the estate as it now
exists.
Blackstone says, "The word'heirs' is necessary in
the grant or donation in order to make a fee or inheri-
tance. For if land be given to a man forever, or to him
and his assigns for ever, this vests in him but an estate
for life." lie then proceeds to point out the exceptions
iiereby the rule " is now softened." It has been frequer
ly held that the rule still exists in Permsylvania though
changed by vatious adjudications for the purpose of d~ing
justice and to give effect to the apparent intent of the
parties. In some of' the later cases there seems to be
a disposition to relax the rule even in executed convey-
ances inter vivos. Thus, in Freyvogle v. Hughes (6 P.
F. Sm., t228) a conveyance was made to a trustee and his
heirs, for the separate use of$ a married woman, no words
of limitation being used as to her estate, and the Supreme
Court held that the limitation of the legal estate was
t
enough to give her a fee, that being the evidenIt intent of
the grantor. Again, in Ringwalt v. Ringwalt (Leg. Int.
1885, p. 80), a conveyance was made of' real and personal
property to the grantor's mother, during his life, re-
18
mainder to his lawful issue if he bad any, and in default
of such issue then to "his surviving brothers or their
legal representatives." It was held that the surviving
brothers took estates in fee. In Mergenthaler's Appeal,
fifteen W. N. C. 442, Judge Gorden said, "it may now be
regarded as settled that even tecinlcal words of limita-
tion found in an executed conveyance, may be so quali-
fied by the context as to make them conform to the inten-
tior of the grantor.-
A further exception to the old colmnon law rule is
found in the case of wills. Wheneverin . will, on a
fair construction of the whole instrument, it appears to
be the intention of the testator to give an estate in fee
use of
such an estate will pass without theAwords of inheritance
(Fulton v. Moore, I Cas. 474 . But, in cases prior to
the act of 8 April 1833 (Wills Act) some intention must
be shown which will be equivalent to the technical words.
Section 9 of" the Wills Aet rrovides that all devises of
real estate shall pass the whole estate of' tl testator
in the premises devised, although there be no words of
inheritance or of perpetuity, unless it appears by a de-
vise over, or by a limitation, or otherwise in the will,
19
that the testator intended to devise a less estate.
This section does not apply to wills executed before the
passage of the act, although the testator died afterwards
(Smith v. Coyle, 1 W. N. C. 370). As at common law, the
ch&ef incident and attribute of an estate in fee simple
in Pennsylvania, is the power of the owner to alien or
transferitand all general provisions and restrictions
upon alienation are voi4, because they are held to be re-
pugnant to the nature of the estate.(Walker v. Vincent,
7 Har. 371). When speaking of common law in this connee-
tion, I rean the later common law since the right to
alien is comparatively recent and is contrary to the feu-
dal doctrine which at first forbade and afterwards dis-
couraged alienation 6f lands, while it recognized smd per-
mitted subinfeudation.
The distinction between estates tail and fees-simple
in Pennsylvania is unimportant since, by statute, es-
tates tail are to be construed into fees-simple. The
question has usually arisen on the distinction between an.
estate tail and a life estate with remainder, or a base
fee wit?1 executory devises after it. The Supreme Court
20
of the state has refused to consider the question as being
of any importance, where the only question was whether
the limitation was a fee-simple or a fee-tail.(Kennedy V.
Humes 15 W. N. C. 508).
Since but few estates tail exist in Pennsylvania at
the present time, and those can readily be converted into
estates in fee-simple, the only pointsof practical impbrt-
ance are how the estate is created and how it may be
barred or changed into an estate in fee-simple.
In regard to the method of creation it is sufficient
to state that estates tail are generally created by convey..
ance or devise to one and the heirs of his body. But
words of procreation are necessary.(Mclntyre vs. Ramsey,
11 Har., 320). The word issue has been held to be an
apt word of limitation and to import a fee-tail. (Gast v.
Baer, 62 Pa. St., 35.) Estates tail had become common
in Pennsylvaia as early as 1705. In that year the gen-
eral assembly of' the province passed an act for barring
them by simple deed, proved or acknowledged and recorded.
This law was rejected by the Queen in council. In 1710
anact containing a similar provision met a like fate.
By the act of 27 January 1749 - 500 Purd. Dig., p.720, p1.
1) fihes and common recoveries were made of thle same ef-
21
fect in barring estates tail as in England. The act
Of 16 January 1799 (Purd. Dig. 721, pl. 3) provided that
entails might be barred by deed in the usual form in fee
simple provided such deed stated an intention -t& bar the
entail, It was further required that after being acknow1-
edged according to law such deed should, on motion in
t
open court, be entered upon the records of the suprene
court or common pleas as sheriff's deeds were requilred to
be, and also to be recorded within six months after its
date in the recorder's office.
A radical change in the law was made by the-Act of
29 April 1855, which provided: "Whenever hereafter, by
any gift conveyance or devise, an estate in fee-tail
would be created according to the existing laws of" this
State, it shall be taken and construed to be an- estate in
fee-simple, and as such shall be inheritable and freely
alienable." In Nichdlson v. Bettle 7 P. F. Sm. 387,
Judge Strong says,"The act of 1855 practically makes the
statuteD e Donis inoperative. It remits us to the com-
mon law as it w~s before 13th Edward I. This dec-
laration of capability of transmission by descent and of
alienability is raere surplusage."
22
The result of this act haR been to prohibit the crea-
tion of an estate tailand the words which would have
amounted to an entail now create an estate in fee-simple.
While estates tail are still to be foumd in Pennsylvania
they were all created previous to April 27, 1855. It is
further provided by the act of 14 April, 1859 that a fin-
al judgment or decree in partition, or any judicial sale,
shall bar an estate tail with the same effect as a common
recovery or deed entered and recorded under the act of
1799, and the purchaser or person to whom the land is de-
creed shall take an estate in fee-simple.(Purd. Dig. 722
p1.6).
Freehold estates not of Inheritance in Pennsylvania
are divided as at the common law into two classes: 1, Con...
ventional. 2, Those created by operation of law.
(1) The first class does not differ materially from
the estate as it existed at commnon law. Words of in-
heriatnce being still necessary to con~vey an estate in
fee-simple, in the absex ce or such words the deed or con-
veyance will pass merely a life est~e. As at co lumon
23
law the estate may be for the life of the grantee or pur
autre vie. Also as at common law, the tenant for life
must not coLmmit wastewhich 4ay be of two kinds. 1, Vol
untary; and 2, Permissive. 1. The tenant for life must
not use the land in such a manner as to cause its value
to dimirlish so that it can not be well appropriated to the
purposes for which it was intended when the life t~nant
came into possession. Thus, in Jones v. Whitehead the
court restrained the tenant for years from plowing up a
meadow for the purpose of sowing the land with corn(l
Parson's Eq. Cas. 304.) In some portionsof Pennsylvania
the old common law rulethat the tenant for life may not
fell timber does not prevail.. It has been held that it
is not waste for tenant to clear wildland of trees when
such land is thereby enhanced in value.
A tenant for life may mine from an open mine and ev-
en make a new opening in order to get at th6 minerals;
but he can not go through ar old opening to reach a new
vein, which is in effect making a new opening (Westmore-
land Coal Co's. Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 344).
The act of 10 April, 1848 provided that no tenant or
tenants for life should be restrained from the reasonable
24
and necessary use and enjoyment Of the lands arid premises
in his, her or their possession.In Irwin v. Covode, 12
Har. 166, the court, in constnuing this act says: "While
the right of possession contirues unquestioned in the
tenant, there is no limitation or restraint whatever im-
posed by our acts of assembly on his working of open
mines. It nay indeed be doubted whether the saving
clauses adverted to, do not empower him to open mines and
quarries that he may have reasonable use &Tid enjoyment!
of the premises, but this we do not decide, for it is not
in thecase."
2. As a general rule, the tenaht for life in Penn-
sylvania is liable for all damages except such. as result
from natural ware and the act of God. The statute of
Gloucester, 6 Edward I., c. 5 (Rob. Dig. 9) has b er held
to be in force in Pennsylvania. It provides: "And he
which shall be attainted of waste shall lose the thing
whichahe hath wasted, arid, moreover shall recompense,
thrice as much as the waste shall be taxed at." But in
Willard v. Willard 56 Pa. St., 119, where there was an
attempt to enforce a forfeiture for waste, the Supreme
Court refused to allow it. The remedies for waste now
25
in use, are - Injunction in Equity, wrkt of estrepement
under the act of 10 April, 1848, commanding the sheriff
to stop waste, action on the case for damages in the nature
of waste and perhaps the old writ of waste.
The estate of" tenant after possibility of issue
extinct cannnot come practically under consideration under
existlr.g laws of Pennsylvania and therefore will not be
further considered.
The furndamental principles of" the law of curtesy in
Pennsylvania are very sirai'ar to the common law principle
of this estate. But the cornmon law rule requiring seize-
in has been modified to a great extent. Thus, where the
wife has th.e right of entry, or constructive seizin, it
has been held that the husband has his curtesy, in cases
where there is no actual adverse possession (Stoolfoos v.
Jenkins 8 S. and R. 175). The intestate Act ct 8 April
1853 sec. 1, Art. IiI provided that the real estate of a
married woman intestate shall descend as th~ereinafter pro-
vided, "saving to' the huIsband his right as tenant b the
26
curtesy, which shall take place although there be no is-
sue of tne marriage in allcases where the issue if any,
would have inherited."
Previois to the passage of' the Married Woman's Act
of April 11, 1848, the lands of' married women were liable
to be taken in execution for the debts of the husband,
and his estate by the curtesy initiate sold by the Sher-
iff in her life time. But the act of 1848 put a stop to
this injustice and secured to married women the enjoyment
of their estates both as to title and possession. Va-
rious acts have been subsequently passed fieclaring the
meaning of the act of 1848.
The act cf 1848 gave married women the right t6 make
wills, but the husband may have his right to take her
real estate as tenant by the curtesy if he does not choose
to take uznder such will. A man who has deserted his
wife or refused to provide for her for one year or up-
wards is not permitted to claim curtesy (act May 4,1855,
sec. 5).
Common law dower can only exist in Pennsylvania at
the present time in cases where a married man conveys his
27
lands or tenements in his life time and his wife does not
join the deed of conveyance. This is due to the various
statutes which have been passed from time to time. Both
dower and' curtesy may be had in an equitable estate (Shoe-
maker v. Walker 2 S.&R. 555). And the seizin of' the hus-
band need be but seizin in law.
The act of April 8, 1833 provided that where n in-
testate shall leave a widow and issue, the former shall
be entitled to one third of his real estate for the term
of her natural life, and to one third of his personal es-
tate absolutely. If' the intestate shall leave a widow,
and collateral and other kindred, but no issue, the widow
shall be entitled to one half of the real estate, (includ..
ing the mansion house and appurtenances) for her life and
to one half of the personal estate absolutely. In de-
fault of known heirs or kindred who might take under the
act, the real estate vests in the widow for such estate
as her husband had therein, anwd sfe is entitled also to
all the personal property, absolutely. This provision
was expressly declared to be "in lieu and full satisfac-
tion of her dower at coimon law."
The Wills Act, 8 April, 183, sec. 11 (Purd. Dig. p.
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1711) provides: "A devise or bequest by a husband to 1is
Wife of any portion of his estate or property, shall be
deemed and taken to be in lieu and bar of her dower in
the estate of such testator, in like manner as if it were
so expressed in the will, unless such testator shall in
his will-declare otherwise. Provided, That nothing here
in contained shall.deprive the widow of her choice, eitha-
er of dower or of the estate or property so devised or
I
bequeathned.
The Married Woman's Act of April 1l, 1848, sec. 11,
declared that the section of' the Wills Act above mentioned
should not be construed to deprive thd widow of a testa-
tor in case she elects not to take under the will of her
his
share of,,persoral estate, but she was given her choice
either of the provision made for her by the will or of
her share of the personal estate inder thd Ihtestate Laws.
The act of April 20, 1869 sec. 1, provided, "In case
tny person has died, or shall hereafter die leaving a wid-
ow and a last will and testament, and such widow shall
eleot not to take under the will, in lieu of' dower at the
common law as Leretof'ore, she shall be en title t to such
interest in the real estate of' her husband as the widows
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Of decedents dying intestate are entitled to under the
existing laws of' this Commonwealth."
Since the passage of' the last mentioned act comnmon
law dower exists in Pennsylvania only in the onre case
previously mentioned.
Dower may be barred in Pennsylvania by,
1. Wife joining in deed of conveyance with separate ac-
knowledgeldent.
2. Divorce, "a vinculo matrimonii."
3. Elopement and adultery of wife.
4. Devise in lieu of' dower.
5. Jointure.
6. Ante nuptial settlement in equity.
7. Sheriff's sale.
8. Orphans' Court sale for payment of debts.
In its general characteristics the Pennsylvan&a es-
tate for years does not differ in any material point from
the commaon law estate of tihe same name.
The statute of' 4 Ann, c. 16, sec. 9 which abolished
the old rule requiring th~e tenant to attorn to the vendee
of his landlord is also in force in Pez~sylvania. Rob-
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ert's Digest, +45 .+46.
In computing the length Of' the term, the old commnon
law rule with regard to the length of a month as laid
down by Blackstorie, does not prevail in Pennsylvania where
a month mIeans a calendar and not a lunar month. (Shap-
ley V. Garey, 6 S. and R. 539). A term for a period
less than three years may be created orally; but if it
exceeds the period of three years a writing is necessary.
Act 21 March, 1772, sec.l, (Purd. Dig. p. 830 pl. 1 ).
The Pennsylvania courts have laid down an exception
to the old coimora law rule that tenant for years is not
entitled to emblements where his estate expires by its
own limitation. By a custom peculiar to Permsylvania,
wh.ere the term ends in the spring tie tenant is permitted
to return during the sunoger, after his estate has expired
and take his grain whIch was sown in the previous autumn.
Bittinger v. Baker, 5 Cas. 66.
The estate from year to year still exists in Penns-
sylvania and is s imilar to th~e com'on law tenancy ±'rom
year to year except that three months notice instead of
six is wequired in order to termidate the tenancy.
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The estates of tenants at will, ap.d at sufferance
still exist in Pennsylvania as at colmmon law and do not
differ from the common law estates, except that in the
case of estates at will the landlord must give three month' S
notice to quit to entitle him to the summary process giv-
en by statute (Purd. Dig. p. 1018 pl. 20, act of 1863.)
While the theory of mortgages in Pennsylvania is
very similar to tlat of the common law, the methods by
which payment of the debt secured by the mortgage is er.-
forced are very urlike those used in England. By a fic-
tion of law the mortgagee has the legal title vested in
him subject to be divested upon the payment of the debt
secured by the mortgage but he has no estate in the
lands. The mortgage in the hands ofthe mortgagee is
merely a chattel real. He has only a debt due him, a
ch.oose-in-action, which, on his death, descends to his
executor and not to his heir. But, notwithstanding this
change brought about by equitable principles, so much of
the common law character of the mortgagee's title still
remains as to enable him to take possession of the proper-
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ty and to bring ejectment f±or it, certainly after default
is made in payment of' the money, or any part of it, accord-
ing to the stipulations of the mortgoge and, perhaps, even
before default. Youngman v. R. R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 278;
Guthrie v. Kahle, 10 Wr. 333. oMortgages by deposit of
title deeds do not exist in Pennsylvania. Bowers v.
Oyster, 3 Pa. St. 233. All mortgages, other than pur-
chase money mortgages (which have sixty days), must be
recorded at once, to secure their lien against other mort_
gages, conveyances and judgments.(Act 28 March,1820).
All mortgages must be irl writing, under seal and acknowl-
edged, and since the act of June 8, 1881, thd defeasance
clause, when separate, must also be by deed, executed at
the saie time as the conveyance, and recorded within six-
ty days. But, notwithstanding the -,lamn words of the
statute, that "no mortgage shall be a lien until left for
record," it ias been held, ir accordance with equitable
principles that an unrecorded mortgage is good against
the mortgagor, and all claiming under him with notice of
the mortgage; and all volunteers are bound by the mort-
gage, whesther they have notice or not. No one is pro-
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tected by the statute but a bona fide purchaser, without
notice. * Mellon's Appeal, 8 Cas. 121. The mortgage has
three remedies: (1) To take possessio. of the-,,mortgaged
Premises during the continuance of the debt, or obtain
Possession by ejectment;(2) After the debt has become due
proceed on the bond which usually contains a power of at-
torney to confess judgment; (3) Issue a scire facias on
the mortgage. The latter course is usually taken, and
the land is sold under a writ of levari facias, by sher-
irf's sale. Ejectment is seldom resorted to on account
of the length of the p-roceedings, and also because the
mortgagee who has recoyvered possession nmust account for
of the estate
all the rents and profits actually received, and also
those which would or might have been received but for his
negligence.
In regard to uses in Pennsylvania, little need be
said. I need but state that the most importa-1t provis-
ions of the Statute of Uses or the Statute 27 Henry VIII
c 10 are still in force in Pennsylvania (Robert's Dig.p
412: Ruish v. Lewis, 9 iar. 73) and then leave the subject.
The only important statutory provision enacted in regard
to trusts is the Act of 22 April, 1856, which provided
that, except implied trusts, all declarations must be in
writing and signed by the person creating same or else mar
ifested, in his last will and testament.
What has been said with regard to the law of Uses
and trusts in Pennsylvania applies equally well to the
law of Rnmainders and Reversions. An examination of the
numerous decisions of the Pennsylvania courts upon this
important brancI, of the law of real property must lead
one to conclude that the entire law of England with re-
gard to remainders and reversions has been adopted in
Pennsylvania with slight if any variations; and such chang-
es as have been made have not effected the principles of
the common law. The decisions of the courts as a gener-
al rule havea tendency to modify the harsh rules of the
comnuon law where this has been practicable, and to give
effect to the apparent intention of' the parties when such
modifications do not contravene public policy. This ten-
dency is especially noticeable in those cases where it
has been attempted to apply the Rule in Shelly's case.
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The courts have not alwaysadhered to the old settled
r1ale with regard to what are words of purchase and what
Mrds of limitation. Though numerous and respectable
way,
authorities may be found the otherAthe doctrine in Perua-
sylvania is, that the rule shLll only take effect, when
it is not controlled by the intention of the testator.
(Lessee of Findlay v. Riddle 3 Bin, 139). But ordinar-
ily, the word "heirs" seems to imply that the ancestor
shall take an estate ±n fee.
Trusts for accmulations, when contrary to a sound
public policy have always been discouraged and discoun-
tenanced by the Pennsylvania courts; and by the act of
14 April, 1853, sec. 9, it was expressly provided that
no person shall settle and dispose of any property so
that the income of the same shall be accumulated for any
longer time than the life or lives of such grantor or
testator, and the term of twenty-one years thereafter.
Knowledge of the old common law with regard to joint
tenancy is chiefly valuable in Pennsylvania in examining
titles which go back of 1812. In that year a statute
was passed which, under the decisions of the courts of
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the state, has turned all such estates into tenancies in
common. It provides: "If partition be not made between
joint tenants, whether they be such as might have been
Compelled to make partition or not or whatever kind the
estate or thing holden or possessed be, the parts of those
who die first shall not accrue tp the su±'vivors but dhall
descend or pass by devise, and shall be subject to debts,
char.ges, curtesy or dower, or transmissible to executors
or administrators and be considered to every other in-
tent and purpose in the same manner as if such deceased
joint tenants had heen tenants in common: Provided always
That nothing in this act shall be taken to affect any
trust estate."(Purd. Dig. 939, p1. 1).
While, in effect, this statute deprives joint estates
of all the peculiar features which distinguish them from
tenancies in common, it does not prohibit testators or
grantors from expressly creating a right of survivorship.
(Arnold v. Jack, 12 Har. 57). But express words are re-
quhted to create such an estate. (Kerr v. Verner. 16 P.
F. Smn. 326)
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Notwithstanding the Married Women's Act of 1848 it
has been decided that estates by the entireties still
exist in Pensylvania, the c-'urt having determined that
the effect of' that act was a protection to her in her
seizin of the whole land, so that she could not be depriv.
ed of it by a sale of her husband's interest therein in
his lifetime. (McCurdy v. Caming 64 Pa. St. 39). Nor
does the act of 1812 which abolished survivorship among
joint tenants apply to this estate. This was decided in
Diver v. Diver 56 Pa. St. 106 where it was determined that
the estate held by husband and wife is not a joint tenan-
cy and thereford not within the tetras of that act.
By the third section of the Intostate Act of 1833,
previously referredto, it is Iwovided that the real es-
tate. of an intestate shall, in certain contirigencies,
therein enumerated, "vest in the father and mother of
such intestate during their joint lives and the life of
the survivor of them." It would seem that in such cases
the father and mother, if both living, take as tenants
by the ent iret ies.
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Estates in Coparcenary can exist in Pennsylvania only
in those cases to which the statute regulating the des-
cent and distribution of Intestate Estates, does not ap-
a...t
ply, since that expressly provides that, where lands des-
cend to several pemons under its provisions, pthey shall
take and hold as tenants in common. Therefore coparce-
nary can exist only in cases of' estate tail and trust es-
tates.
Tenancies in common, in Pennsylvania, are so very
similar to the same estate at coimmon law as not to re-
quire any further sonsideration here. The acts which
have been passed applying to this estate are few and have
to do with the law of procedure rather than substantive
law.
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n.In the preceding pages I have attempted to outline
briefly the leading changes it. the law of Real Property
in Pennsylvania with reference to the Yarious estates
now In existence and to define to some extent the nature
of such cheanges and the characteristics which distinguish
the modern law of Real Property in that state from thd laf
as it existed at con umon law.
I propose now to discus briefly a few minor subjects
having reference to no estate in particular.
And first, with regard to fixtures. The old doc-
trine that whatever is fastened to the soil belongs there-
to has been exploded as a test or criterion by which a
case is to be decided. Perhaps the leading Pennsylvar.ia
case Upon the subject of fixtures is Meigs' Appeal, 12
P. F. Sm. , 28, where a question was raised as to the
character of certain frame buildings which the United
States government had erected upon York Conmon as barracks
for troops during the Civil War. If they were realty,
and formed part of the land, they belonged to the borough
of York which owned the land. If personalty, they be-
longed to the United St ates Government or its vendels,
and they had the right to remove them. It was argued on
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behalf of the borough of York, that tile buildings were
erected upon posts which were sunk deeply into the ground
and therefore, being fastened directly to the soil and
not merely placed and rested upon it, they were part of
the land. But Judge Agnew, delivering the opinion of
the Court, said, "The old notion of a physical attacmlent
has long since been exploded in this State. * + ++ The
question of' fixtures or not depends upon the nature and
character of the act by which the structure is put in
place, the policy of' the law connected with its purpose,
and the intentions of those concerned in the act."
The law with respect to party walls has been ef-
fected to some extent by two statutes. The first passed
in 1721, gave to the owner of land the right to enter up-
on his neighbor's groumd and to build his wall equally
upon his own land and that of his neighbor, an ....provided
that before the neighbor should Use the )Crty wall so
built, he should pay the first builder for so much of t1a
wa~l as he intended to n~ke use of. The other act passed
April 10, 1849 (Purd. Dig. 1307) provided that the right
to the party wall, orto compensation for it, should pass
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to the purchaser on a conveyance of the house, unless other-
wise expressed in the deed, thus making the party wall a
part of the realty and an appurtenance to the land on
r
which the house frist built is erected.(Knight v. Bebnken,
6 Cas. 372.)
The rule laid down by thecourts of most of the -states
that the title to land bounded by large navigable streams
of water extends omly to high-water mark differs somewhat
from the Pennsylvania rule which extends the title of the
riparian owner to low-water mark, subject to the right
of the public to pass over so much of it as lies between
low and high water mark, when covered with water.(Pursell
v. Stover, 14 Out. 43).
The English doctrine that the navigability of a stream
depends upon the ebb and flow of the tide has. never been
intm duced into Pennsylvania where many rivers are navig-
able far above tide-water.(Carson v. Blazer 2 Binn. 476).
But few decisions have been rendered in Penn~sylvania
bearing upon the subject of "commor", and the few cases
which have found their way to the Supreme Court have been
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decided in accordarce with commuon law principles.
The law of easements in Pennsylvania is similar,
wherever recognized, to the common law. The common law
of England with reference to public Ways or Highways,
Private Ways, Ways of Necessity, Water-courses and other
water rights, Lateral support, Drain and drtp, Hurial
lots and Pews is equally applicableto Pensylvania. But
the conmion law rule with regard to the easement of "light
andair" has never been acknowledged in Pennsylvania.
The right to air and light may exist, but only by virtue
of an express grant.(Haverstick v. Sipe, 9 Cas. 371.)
While the Recording Acts of Pennsylvania can not
properly be considered a part of t.1e substantive law of
Real Property within the scope of this thesis, yet a thor-
ough knowledge of them is absolutely necessary in order
to arrive at a full and accurate understanding of the gen-
eral law. The first recording act passed in Pennsylvan-
ia which received the assent of the crown was te Act
of 28 May, 1715 which is still in force. Another act
amending the act of' 1715 was passed March 18, 1775. The
substance of both thlese acts is incorpotated in t he Act
of 19 May, 1893(Laws of 1893 p. 109) which provides that
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all deeds not acknowledged and recorded within ninety
days"shall be adjudged fraudulent and void as to arq sub-
Sequent purchaser for a valid consideration, or mortgagee
or creditor of the grantor or bargainor therein."

